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Abstract
Background: Individuals with Down syndrome (DS) and individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) have poor
navigation skills, which impact their potential to become independent. Two aspects of navigation were investigated
in these groups, using virtual environments (VE): route knowledge (the ability to learn the way from A to B by
following a fixed sequence of turns) and configural knowledge (knowledge of the spatial relationships between
places within an environment).
Methods: Typically developing (TD) children aged 5 to 11 years (N = 93), individuals with DS (N = 29) and individuals
with WS (N = 20) were presented with a sparse and a rich VE grid maze. Within each maze, participants were asked to
learn a route from A to B and a route from A to C before being asked to find a novel shortcut from B to C.
Results: Performance was broadly similar across sparse and rich mazes. The majority of participants were able to learn
novel routes, with poorest performance in the DS group, but the ability to find a shortcut, our measure of configural
knowledge, was limited for all three groups. That is, 59 % TD participants successfully found a shortcut, compared to
10 % participants with DS and 35 % participants with WS. Differences in the underlying mechanisms associated with
route knowledge and configural knowledge and in the developmental trajectories of performance across groups were
observed. Only the TD participants walked a shorter distance in the last shortcut trial compared to the first, indicative of
increased configural knowledge across trials. The DS group often used an alternative strategy to get from B to C,
summing the two taught routes together.
Conclusions: Our findings demonstrate impaired configural knowledge in DS and in WS, with the strongest deficit in
DS. This suggests that these groups rely on a rigid route knowledge based method for navigating and as a result are
likely to get lost easily. Route knowledge was also impaired in both DS and WS groups and was related to different
underlying processes across all three groups. These are discussed with reference to limitations in attention and/or
visuo-spatial processing in the atypical groups.
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Background
Our ability to navigate successfully in large-scale space is
crucial to everyday living [41]. Developmentally, we
initially learn the way from A to B by following a fixed
sequence of turns, using landmarks as reference points, a
strategy referred to as the use of route knowledge [42].
Whilst this strategy is effective, it has limitations because
it is inflexible to deviations from the known route. It is be-
cause young children rely on route knowledge that they
easily get lost and find it difficult to re-orient themselves if
they are forced to take a detour from their usual route.
A more flexible stage of route learning involves know-
ledge of the spatial relationships between places within an
environment. This is referred to as configural knowledge or
the ability to hold a ‘cognitive map’. Developmentally, chil-
dren become gradually more able to use the configuration
of the environment as a strategy to successfully find their
way around (i.e. they develop a cognitive map) between 5
and 10 years of age [6]. This configural knowledge of the
environment enables us to find shortcuts or alternative
routes between two known places and to re-orient and find
our way back if we get lost.
Route knowledge and configural knowledge are qualita-
tively different wayfinding strategies [31]. This is true at
both the behavioural level and the neural level. That is, in
adults, knowledge related to walking a fixed route activates
the caudate nucleus, whilst knowledge related to the con-
figural structure of an environment activates the hippo-
campus [22]. In the current study, we were interested not
only in route learning abilities in typical children but also
in two neurodevelopmental disorder groups, Down syn-
drome (DS) and Williams syndrome (WS). Individuals
with DS and with WS have different uneven cognitive
profiles, but both have atypicalities in the structure and
function of the hippocampus (DS: [35]; WS: [29]). This
suggests that configural knowledge is likely to be impaired
in both DS and WS, but that performance will be
associated with differing underlying mechanisms. Thus,
the comparison of these two groups, along with typical
development, offers insight into the mechanisms that act
as limiting factors to the development of configural
knowledge, either through impairment or immaturity.
Furthermore, comparison between two different neuro-
developmental disorders will enable differentiation between
syndrome-specific impairments and those associated with
having more general learning difficulties. The aim of the
current study was to investigate the development of both
route knowledge and configural knowledge in these groups
by asking participants to learn novel routes (route
knowledge) and to find the shortest route between two
known places in a virtual environment (VE) (configural
knowledge). We also included a battery of attention tasks
(discussed below), as mechanisms that we predicted would
be associated with navigation performance.
Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare genetic disorder with
a prevalence of between approximately 1 in 7500 [44] and
1 in 20,000 [32]. Individuals with WS present with
moderate learning difficulties and a cognitive profile in
which visuo-spatial abilities are weaker than verbal abil-
ities [20]. Recent studies have explored route learning in
both real-world and virtual environments in WS. This has
demonstrated the ability to develop route knowledge of
both real and virtual environments in this group [16–18,
36]. However, we know very little about large-scale config-
ural knowledge in WS. In Farran et al. [16], the experi-
menter led participants with WS around a 1-km route
and then asked the participant to lead the experimenter.
As a measure of large-scale route knowledge, participants
received a score out of 20 for the number of correct turns
made. As a measure of large-scale configural knowledge,
participants were asked to stop at four locations along the
route and to point in the direction of three landmarks on
the route that were not visible at that point in time. As
stated above, participants developed route knowledge, i.e.
they were able to learn the majority of turns along the
route, but they had no understanding of the configural
structure of the environment. However, as Farran et al.
[16] report the same pattern of findings in a group of
individuals with moderate learning difficulties (MLD)
matched to the WS group by non-verbal ability, it does
not appear to be syndrome specific. It is possible that the
results do not represent a true failure to understand the
configural structure in WS and MLD groups, but reflected
a lack of opportunity to become familiar with the route
because they were only given two opportunities to retrace
the route. This latter consideration is countered by
Broadbent et al. [1], who used a virtual environment
cross-maze (a square maze with four radial arms). After
extensive experience of the maze, participants were asked
to walk the shortest route to one of four exits. Whilst typ-
ically developing 5- to 10-year-olds showed developmental
progression from an egocentric route-based strategy to a
configural strategy, the WS group showed atypical
performance, often walking inefficient routes to reach the
required exit. Furthermore, when asked to indicate which
of the six maps represented the maze, they demonstrated
a weak cognitive representation of the layout of the
environment, also suggestive of poor large-scale configural
knowledge. Individuals with WS are unable to use
the geometry of a room to orient themselves in a re-
orientation task, but can use a single landmark as a
directional cue [26], which further supports the notion of
poor configural knowledge in this group.
Studies that have investigated large-scale visual search
in WS tap into different but overlapping skills compared
to the skills measured by route learning studies. Both in-
vestigate configural information in WS, but visual search
tasks use an open environment in which all landmarks
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are simultaneously visible. This makes the configural
structure of the environment directly visible. In route
learning tasks, participants walk along paths and most
landmarks are only visible from the path on which they
feature, with a few distant landmarks visible from multiple
places within the environment. Thus, the configural struc-
ture is not directly visible. Three studies have explored
large-scale visual search in WS, all of which report impair-
ments which can, at least in part, be accounted for by
impaired understanding of the configural structure of
landmarks within the search array, despite the landmarks
being simultaneously visible [21, 27, 43].
Evidence from small-scale tasks also suggests poor
configural knowledge in WS. Nardini et al. [33] demon-
strated that individuals with WS were unable to use the
spatial configuration of landmarks to find a target.
Broadbent et al. [5] and Bernardino et al. [2] demonstrated
impaired performance in WS on three-dimensional per-
spective taking tasks. Success on such tasks requires an
understanding of the spatial relationships among the
objects in the array. More generally, individuals with WS
display a local level bias (and thus reduced attention to
global and configural information) on some small-scale
visuo-spatial tasks such as block construction and drawing
tasks (see [19]) and during face processing [24]. However,
note that developmental studies do not consistently show
a direct mapping between small-scale spatial skills and
spatial knowledge on large-scale tasks (see [37]), and so
we cannot assume that these deficits in WS are associated
with the evidence above which suggests impaired config-
ural knowledge on large-scale tasks in this group.
Down syndrome, also a genetic disorder, has a preva-
lence of between 1 and 3 per 1000 live births [11]. The
level of IQ in DS broadly compares to that in WS, but the
cognitive profile reflects weaker verbal than visuo-spatial
abilities. The visuo-spatial cognitive profile observed in
DS has been contrasted to that observed in WS; evidence
from block construction and drawing tasks demonstrate a
global level bias in DS (in contrast to the local level bias
observed in WS) (e.g. [1]). However, the evidence below
regarding large-scale spatial competence in DS does not
suggest that this attentional bias towards global or config-
ural information pervades to large-scale space. This is not
surprising, given that small-scale local and global process-
ing relate to processing styles, where as large-scale config-
ural knowledge reflects a developmental endpoint, i.e.
adult-level navigational ability which develops with cogni-
tive maturity and experience (cf. [42]).
There have been four studies that have assessed naviga-
tion in DS. One of the studies discussed above also
included a DS group [36]. Purser et al. [36] tested route
knowledge, but did not test configural knowledge. They
showed that individuals with DS could learn a six-turn
route, but route knowledge in DS was much poorer than
the WS group. Similarly, Davis et al. [10] reported that
individuals with DS committed more errors in a route
learning task than individuals with intellectual disability
and a typically developing group matched on mental age.
Pennington et al. [34] used a virtual version of the Morris
water maze. This showed that individuals with DS had
difficulty using landmarks within the environment to
locate a hidden platform, i.e. they had poor configural
knowledge. Edgin et al. [14] used the virtual Morris water
maze used in Pennington et al. [34]; no differences were
reported between a DS group and a mental-aged matched
typically developing group aged 3 to 8 years. However,
Edgin et al. [14] reported high rates of non-completion
and error rates on this task so this result might not reflect
true ability levels. As a precursor to the current study,
Courbois et al. [9] investigated configural knowledge in a
small group of participants with DS. Ten participants with
DS learnt two short routes before being asked to find the
shortest route from the beginning of one route to the end
of the other. Performance was poor, with only two of the
ten DS participants able to find the shortest route. This
compared to a success rate of 50 % in a mental age-
matched typically developing (TD) group and 100 %
success rate in a chronological age-matched TD group
and again suggests poor configural knowledge in DS.
In the current study, configural knowledge was assessed
in addition to route knowledge in both DS and WS. Given
that we know that route knowledge is available to both
groups (e.g. [16–18, 36]), it is important to explore the
deficit in configural knowledge in these groups. This was
the largest investigation of large-scale configural know-
ledge to-date in both the DS and WS population, and the
first time that cross-syndrome comparison of large-scale
configural knowledge had been carried out.
With the advent of easily accessible virtual reality,
many studies now employ VEs to explore route learning
ability. This has advantages over the real-world in terms
of experimental control and aspects related to fatigue
and the length of assessments. However, in controlling
VEs to manipulate variables of interest such as junction
type, the number and type of landmarks, and the layout
of environments, most studies that have employed VEs
have used relatively sparse environments, i.e. brick wall
mazes and/or a limited set of landmarks. Although it has
been shown that the skills used when navigating VEs
map onto the same skills when navigating in the real
world [40], it is important to determine how perform-
ance in sparse virtual environments compares to that in
rich, more ecologically valid virtual environments. This
was the second aim of the current study. Each partici-
pant took part in two conditions, one in which they
learnt routes and were asked to find a shortcut in a
sparse brick wall maze and one condition with an identi-
cal procedure, which employed a rich maze which
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featured buildings instead of brick walls (see Fig. 1). To
our knowledge, comparison of performance in sparse vs.
rich environments has hitherto not been made before
either in typical or atypical groups.
We also investigated the possible differential contribu-
tion of different types of attention processes to route and
configural knowledge. In a previous study, different com-
ponents of attention differentiated the DS and WS groups
from the typical groups with respect to route knowledge;
response time on a Go/No Go task was related to per-
formance in the TD group, whilst errors on the Go/No
Go tasks predicted performance in the DS and WS groups
[36]. This differentiation can be related to selective
attention and inhibition, respectively. Indeed, difficulties
with inhibition are consistent with previous research for
both DS and WS [8, 28].
In the current study, we will determine the attentional
mechanisms associated with route knowledge and with
configural knowledge for sparse and for rich environ-
ments. Because attention, as measured by a single task,
was predictive of route learning in Purser et al. [36] in a
DS and WS group, we have included a larger battery of
attention tasks here to gain a better understanding of
this relationship. Given that distant landmarks are
particularly useful cues when developing configural
knowledge, and the requirement to switch from an
egocentric to an allocentric representation of the envir-
onment, it is possible that selective attention and/or
attention switching will be particularly important for the
development of configural knowledge. We also predict
that the attentional mechanisms required to navigate in
a sparse or rich environment will differ on account of
the stronger requirement to select appropriate infor-
mation to attend to in the rich maze. The attention
battery was chosen to reflect multi-component models
of attention (e.g. [15, 30]) and thus measured: selective
attention, sustained attention and attention switching.
The Go/No Go task was also included as a measure of
executive control and to provide a link between this study
and Purser et al. [36].
Methods
Participants
There were three participant groups: 93 TD individuals
(43 males, 50 females), 29 individuals with DS (20 males,
9 females) and 20 individuals with WS (10 males, 10
females). All DS and WS groups had received both pheno-
typic and genetic diagnosis by their clinician. The TD
group was an opportunity sample from local schools, with
no known diagnoses of neurodevelopmental disorders.
Thirty-two of the TD group, 11 of the DS group and the
whole WS group were English, and the remaining partici-
pants were French. Recruitment of all participants was via
schools and parent-support groups. Raven’s Coloured
Progressive Matrices (RCPM; [38]), a measure of non-
verbal mental age, was administered to all participants.
English participants with DS or WS were also tested on
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (BPVS; [12]), a
measure of receptive vocabulary, whereas the French par-
ticipants with DS or WS were tested on the equivalent,
L'échelle de vocabulaire en images Peabody (EVIP; [13]).
For the sake of brevity, both tests will hereafter be referred
to as BPVS. Comparison of group means demonstrated an
effect of age (F(2, 139) = 187.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .73). Tukey
comparisons demonstrated that the TD group were
younger than the two atypical groups (ps < .001), with no
difference between the DS and WS groups (p = .12). There
was a group difference for RCPM (F(2, 139) = 79.90,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .54); the TD group was stronger than
the DS and WS groups (p < .001), who showed no
difference (p = .10). The WS group had higher BPVS
scores than the DS group, t (47)=7.53, p < .001.
Participant information (mean, standard deviation and
range) is given in Table 1.
Fig. 1 Screenshots of the sparse and rich maze. a Sparse maze. b. Rich maze
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Maze task
The main experimental task was a VE maze, created
using Virtools 5.0, a 3D software toolkit. The maze was
laid out in a grid of 16 ‘blocks’. Fifteen landmarks
featured on the paths in the maze.
There were two conditions: Rich and Sparse, each with
the same layout and same number of landmarks. In the
Sparse condition, the blocks were uniform brickwork
and each appeared identical to every other (Fig. 1a). In
the Rich condition, the blocks appeared as detailed and
realistically rendered street blocks and each block was
unique (Fig. 1b). In both conditions, there were three
‘sheds’ hidden in recesses within particular blocks. Each
participant started the maze at a brown shed, which
contained a locked box. There were two further sheds in
each condition, a blue one and a green one, both of
which contained a hidden key.
In each condition, there were two routes to learn: from
the brown shed to the blue shed and back again (to open
the box with the key) and from the brown shed to the
green shed and back again (Fig. 2). To ensure equivalent
difficulty levels across rich and sparse conditions, the
routes in the sparse condition were mirror images of the
routes in the rich condition.
There were two non-overlapping sets of landmarks, so
that there were 2 × 2 possible combinations of condi-
tions and landmark sets. Each participant completed one
sparse condition and one rich condition; order of
condition, order of route learned, and landmark set were
fully counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
Participants took part in two sessions, spaced no more
than 3 weeks apart. Each session started with one condi-
tion of the maze task (Rich or Sparse), followed either
by the attention test battery (see below), or followed by
RCPM (and also BPVS for the WS and DS groups).
Maze task condition and the subsequent tasks were
counterbalanced between the first and second sessions
across participants.
Each participant first completed a short familiarisation
maze with no landmarks and with plain blue walls. In
the familiarisation maze, participants started next to a
locked box of treasure and were instructed to go forward
and find the key to open the box. Participants followed a
single path which included making two right angle turns;
there were no direction decisions to be made.
Movement through the maze was controlled by a com-
bination of computer keyboard and mouse: the space
bar caused forwards movement, whilst orientation was
achieved by the mouse. Participants could orient up-
wards and downwards as well as orienting left and right.
At the end of the maze was a key, which was picked up
by walking into it. A key symbol appeared and remained
at the edge of the screen to remind the participant that
they were in possession of the key. On returning to the
box and walking into it, there was an animation of the
box opening to reveal a large golden star.
After the familiarisation maze, the participant was
instructed that the main game was about to begin. It
was explained again that the game involved finding the
key to open the box of treasure, but that this time if the
participant made a wrong turn, their path would be
blocked by a red barrier, so they would need to try a
different way. On an initial learning trial, all the barriers
were visible, clearly blocking incorrect paths such that
participants could only follow the correct route to the
key and back. On subsequent trials, however, partici-
pants were instructed to walk the correct route from
memory. Thus, barriers were invisible unless the partici-
pant attempted to pass down an incorrect path.
Similarly, the barriers disappeared after the participant
moved away from them. Each triggering of a barrier
counted as an error. The participant repeated the entire
return route, from box to key and back, until it was
completed twice in a row without triggering any barrier,
up to a maximum of ten attempts. The dependent vari-
able was the number of errors made in total across all
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for route learning and the
cognitive test battery
Mean SD Range
Age (years; months)
TD 8;6 1;6 5;5–11;4
DS 19;11 4;0 14;5–26;5
WS 22;0 7;8 13;5–44;5
BPVS (raw)
TD - - -
DS 60 27 21–138
WS 117 25 70–159
RCPM (raw)
TD 28 4.4 17–36
DS 17 4.0 10–27
WS 20 4.7 12–30
Route learning errors
Rich
TD 16 18 0–69
DS 53 58 1–252
WS 50 54 0–221
Sparse
TD 14 18 0–97
DS 42 42 1–173
WS 43 37 3–126
TD typically developing, DS down syndrome, WSWilliams syndrome, BPVS British
picture vocabulary scale, RCPM Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices
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attempts at learning a route. If the participant travelled
past the shed (with key hidden within) twice without
noticing it, the experimenter said “I think you are close,
stop and look around you”.
After this procedure for the first route in each condi-
tion, the participant was informed that a different route
was about to be learned, in which the key was hidden in
a different place from before. The procedure was then
repeated for the second route. If a participant success-
fully learned both routes, they were tested on their
ability to find a shortcut between the two key locations.
If the participant learned the route to the blue shed first,
the start point was the blue shed and the key would be
hidden in the green shed. If the route to the green shed
had been learned first, the start point was the green shed
and the key would be hidden in the blue shed. The
participant was instructed “You are going to start at the
blue (or green) shed and need to go straight to the green
(or blue) shed in the quickest way possible, get the key
and come back to open the box. There are no barriers
now, so you can go any way you want to. You need to
go the quickest way, though. Once you have the key, go
back the way you came and open the box.” The partici-
pant was given feedback as to whether the quickest
route had been used each time. There was a time limit
of 60 s for each attempt; there was a maximum of five
attempts to find the quickest route on two consecutive
trials; if successful, the participant was credited with
knowledge of the shortcut.
Attention test battery
Go/No Go task
Go/No Go (GNG) was chosen as a measure of executive
control. A pseudo-random series of 5-cm diameter red,
purple, orange and yellow solid circles was presented on
a computer, against a white background. The partici-
pant was told that he/she was going to play the
‘White Game’ and was instructed to press the space
bar as rapidly as possible when he/she saw each
circle, unless it was red, in which case he/she should
refrain from pressing the space bar. If the space bar
was pressed on red, a buzzing ‘error’ noise was heard
and the circle disappeared. Each circle disappeared
after 2 s if the space bar was not pressed. If the
participant pressed the space bar on two subsequent
red trials, he/she was reminded of the task rules. Red
trials constituted 1/4 of all trials. There were 8 prac-
tice trials, followed by 64 experimental trials. The
dependent measures were the average reaction time
for correct hits and the number of errors (pressing
the space bar for a red circle).
Sustained attention task
A pseudo-random series of 5-cm diameter white, pink,
green and blue solid circles was presented on a com-
puter, against a black background. The participant was
told that he/she was going to play the ‘Black Game’ and
was instructed to press the space bar as rapidly as
possible when he/she saw each blue circle, but to refrain
from pressing the space bar on seeing all other colours.
If the space bar was pressed on the other colours, or was
not pressed on a blue trial, a buzzing ‘error’ noise was
heard and the circle disappeared. Each circle disappeared
after 2 s if the space bar was not pressed. If the partici-
pant failed to press the space bar on a blue trial, he/she
was reminded of the task rules. Blue trials constituted
1/8 of all trials. There were 8 practice trials, followed by
64 experimental trials. The dependent measure was the
average reaction time for correct hits.
Fig. 2 Layouts of the maze and treasure chests (A, B and C) for sparse and rich environments. a Sparse maze. b Rich maze
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Switching attention task
The participant was told that the Black and White
Games would now be mixed together and was reminded
of the rules for each. There were eight practice trials of
the Black Game, followed by eight practice trials of the
White Game. There then followed two 16-trial blocks of
the Black Game, alternating with two 16-trial blocks of
the White Game. The dependent measure was the average
reaction time for correct hits in the White Game trials. A
switching measure was calculated by subtracting this
average from the average reaction time for correct hits in
the main GNG task.
Selective attention task
The selective attention task was adapted from a ‘flanker’
task (e.g., [25]). Each stimulus consisted of a row of five
arrows, with the target in the central position. Trials
were either congruent, on which the arrows pointed in
the same direction, <<<<< or >>>>>, or incongruent, >>
< >> or << > <<. The participant’s task was to press the
space bar as rapidly as possible only if the central arrow
pointed left. The rules were explained with the aid of
pointing to the left to clarify matters in case the partici-
pant was not confident with the left vs. right distinction.
If the space bar was pressed when the central arrow
pointed to the right, a buzzing ‘error’ noise was heard
and the stimulus disappeared. Each trial’s stimulus
disappeared after 1.5 s if the space bar was not pressed.
If the participant failed to press the space bar on two
consecutive ‘left’ trials, he/she was reminded of the task
rules. ‘Left’ trials constituted 1/2 of all trials. There were
8 practice trials, followed by 64 experimental trials. The
dependent measures were the average reaction time for
correct hits on both congruent and incongruent ‘left’
trials. A selective attention measure was subsequently
computed by subtracting the former from the latter.
Results
Route knowledge
Predictors of route knowledge
Each time that the participant hit a barrier, this counted
as an error. The cumulative number of errors made
across learning trials for the two routes was calculated
for each participant. Correlations between overall route
knowledge errors and other measures were calculated
for each group separately (see Table 2 for descriptive
statistics of the attention measures). There were extreme
values on various measures in the DS and WS groups.
However, there were no grounds for believing that these
values reflected error rather than genuine cognitive
variability. Therefore, these values were retained, but
these groups’ data were analysed non-parametrically to
avoid undue influence by individual data points. Correla-
tions are shown in Table 3. These analyses were repeated
for route knowledge errors in rich and sparse mazes
separately (the sum of errors made across learning
trials for the two learnt routes); there was little differ-
ence in the patterns of correlation, so these separate
analyses have been omitted for brevity. The analysis
was further repeated using z-scores (calculated from
the mean and standard deviation of each group separ-
ately), as a way of normalising any differences in the
extent of within-group variation across measures and
across groups; this made no difference to the patterns
of correlations and so we can be confident that the
patterns of correlation observed in Table 3 are not
related to reduced variability in any of the measures.
As can be seen in Table 3, for the TD group, most
measures significantly correlated with route know-
ledge errors. For the DS group, only RT in the
switching attention Go/No Go task (this represents
RT on the Go/No Go task when administered as an
interleaved block with the sustained attention task; a
combined measure of switching and executive control)
predicted route knowledge. For the WS group, only
RCPM predicted route knowledge.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the attention test battery
Mean SD Range
Go/No Go task reaction time
TD 0.58 0.14 0.38–1.16
DS 0.75 0.25 0.45–1.34
WS 0.61 0.13 0.35–0.83
Go/No Go errors
TD 1.85 1.86 0–8
DS 1.97 2.15 0–8
WS 2.10 2.01 0–9
GNG RT in the switching condition
TD 0.64 0.14 0.43–1.15
DS 0.84 1.89 0.53–1.31
WS 0.69 0.13 0.48–0.92
Switching reaction time
TD 0.06 0.08 –0.15–0.28
DS 0.08 0.18 −0.30–0.41
WS 0.07 0.07 −0.08–0.22
Sustained attention reaction time
TD 0.67 0.18 0.46–1.43
DS 0.81 0.24 0.51–1.42
WS 0.66 0.15 0.46–0.94
Selective attention reaction time
TD 0.10 0.08 −0.07–0.42
DS 0.12 0.28 −0.39–0.91
WS 0.18 0.16 −0.07–0.53
TD typically developing, DS down syndrome, WS Williams syndrome
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Multiple regression
Only one significant predictor of route knowledge
emerged from the correlational analysis for the DS and
WS groups and so multiple regression would not be
informative. To discover which variables uniquely
predicted route knowledge performance in the TD
group, three separate forwards stepwise multiple regres-
sion analyses were run, with overall errors, errors in the
rich condition and errors in the sparse condition as
dependent variables, and pure-blocks Go/No Go RT,
switching-blocks Go/No Go RT, sustained attention RT
and selective attention RT as predictors (i.e. the signifi-
cant predictors from the correlational analyses). Age and
RCPM were not included because they reflect a multi-
tude of factors: the aim was to investigate the influence
of cognitive components. The criterion for adding each
variable was whether its addition caused a significant
change in F. For overall route knowledge errors
sustained, attention RT explained 8 % of variance, F-
change (1,88) = 7.29, p = .008 and selective attention
RT explained an additional 5 %, F-change (1,88) =
5.25, p = .025. For errors in the rich condition, sustained
attention was the lone predictor, explaining 8 % of vari-
ance, F-change (1,88) = 8.00, p = .006. For errors in the
sparse condition, selective attention RT alone explained
12 % of variance, F-change (1,88) = 11.56, p = .001.
Trajectory analyses
To compare developmental trajectories, parametric methods
were necessary. Therefore, participants scoring more than
3 standard deviations above the group mean of the
dependent variable (overall route knowledge errors) were
excluded. Using this criterion, one participant was
excluded from the WS group. In order for the ranges of
the covariate to be similar across the groups, the four
participants with the lowest RCPM scores in the DS group
were also excluded. The ANCOVA model included inter-
action terms between the RCPM covariate and the
between-subjects factor to explore whether route know-
ledge performance developed at a different rate in each
group with reference to non-verbal ability. The data were
analysed with respect to RCPM rather than chronological
age because chronological age ranges were largely non-
overlapping between the TD and disorder groups. So that
any differences in the intercepts of the trajectories were
meaningful, RCPM was rescaled such that the analysis
reflected the intercept at the lowest RCPM score of the
groups. This does not change the analysis, but aids
interpretation.
Analyses of order effects were carried out prior to
exploring differences across rich and sparse mazes.
Route knowledge errors did not differ according to
which landmark set was paired with which maze, F (1,
130) = 2.58, p = .15, ηp
2 = .02. There was, an interaction
between maze order and maze type (F (1, 130) =
19.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13); participants performed better
on the maze that they completed second, indicative of
procedural practice effects (rich maze first, t(69) =
4.93, p < .001; sparse maze first, t (65) = −2.77, p = .007).
This could not affect the pattern of results because
counterbalancing of maze order neutralised the prac-
tice effect.
A mixed-design ANCOVA with route knowledge
errors as the dependent variable, group as the between-
subjects factor, maze type as the within-subjects factor
and RCPM as the covariate was carried out. This
revealed no main effect of maze type, F < 1, nor any
reliable interaction of maze type and group, F(2130) =
1.37, p = .26, ηp
2 = .02, nor of maze type and RCPM, F < 1.
The following analyses, therefore, reflect cumulative
route knowledge errors across rich and sparse mazes.
Overall, route knowledge errors differed across
groups, F(2, 133) = 20.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23, on account
of fewer errors made by the TD group than the WS
and DS groups (Sidak-adjusted post hoc tests, p < .05
for both), with no difference in errors between the
two disordered groups (p > .05) (see Table 1 for mean
route knowledge errors). A univariate ANCOVA with
overall route knowledge errors as the dependent
variable, group as the between-subjects factor and
RCPM as the covariate revealed a significant group
effect at the lowest level of non-verbal ability, F(2,
130) = 5.80, p = .004, ηp
2 = .082. Paired comparisons
showed that the TD group made fewer errors than
the WS group at the trajectory intercept, F(1, 107) =
26.04, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20, with no differences for other
comparisons (DS vs. WS, F(1, 39) =1.65, p = .21, ηp
2 = .04;
TD vs. DS, F(1, 114) = 2.43, p = .12, ηp
2 = .02). RCPM was
reliably negatively related to route knowledge errors,
F(1, 130) = 10.14, p = .002, ηp
2 = .072.
Table 3 Correlations between route learning errors and other measures
Age BPVS RCPM GNG RT GNG error SWGNG RT SW RT SU RT SEL RT Rich errors Sparse errors
TD −.43** N/A −.32** .32** .06 .28** −.08 .36** .24* .80** .66**
DS −.02 −.22 −.22 .33 .13 .58** .22 .26 −.18 .94** .89**
WS −.03 −.33 −.74** .14 .13 −.06 −.23 .24 −.27 .91** .90**
BPVS British picture vocabulary scale, RCPM Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, GNG RT Go/No Go task reaction time, GNG error Go/No Go errors, SWGNG RT
GNG RT in the switching condition, SW RT switching reaction time, SU RT sustained attention reaction time, SEL RT selective attention reaction time
*p < .05; **p < .01
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There was a significant interaction of group and
RCPM (see Fig. 3), F(2, 130) = 4.27, p = .016, ηp
2 = .062,
which is indicative of difference in the slopes of the
developmental trajectories across groups. There was no
reliable difference in trajectory slopes between the TD
and DS groups, F(1, 114) < 1, nor the DS and WS
groups, F (1,39) = 2.14, p = .152, ηp
2 = .052. However, the
WS group’s route knowledge errors decreased more than
the TD group’s with increasing RCPM score, F (1, 107)
= 17.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .142.
Configural knowledge
Shortcut finding
Participants who successfully learnt the two routes to a
criterion of two consecutive trials without error, i.e.
those who had route knowledge, qualified for the short-
cut assessment for that maze. Route knowledge was
achieved in at least one of the two mazes for 87/93
(94 %) TD participants, 17/29 (59 %) DS participants
and 13/20 (65 %) WS participants (see Fig. 4). Partici-
pants were credited with having found the shortcut if
they succeeded in finding the shortcut on two consecu-
tive trials in a maximum of five trials (two TD, one DS
and two WS had learnt the two routes of a maze, but
either refused to complete the shortcut assessment for
that maze, or failed to understand the task requirements;
these participants are credited with not finding the
shortcut for that maze). Considering each group as a
whole, 55/93 (59 %) TD participants successfully found
the shortcut on at least one of the two mazes, whilst
3/29 (10 %) participants with DS found it, and 7/20
(35 %) of the WS group. Frequency data is shown in
Fig. 4. Chi-squared analysis demonstrated a significant
association between group and shortcut success, χ2
(2) = 22.29, p < .001. Adjusted standardised residuals
demonstrated that this was due to an association with
finding the shortcut for the TD group (adjusted standar-
dised residuals ±4.4), with not finding the shortcut for the
DS group (adjusted standardised residuals ±4.3) and no
significant association for the WS group (adjusted
standardised residuals ±1.0).
Configural knowledge score
We observed that some participants walked a slightly
longer ‘shortcut’, or walked the shortcut in one direction,
but not for the return journey, thus showing evidence of
configural knowledge without meeting the shortcut
criterion. A configural knowledge score was created by
scoring a participant’s routes for each shortcut trial.
Specifically, each trial was scored from 0 to 6 as follows:
using the shortcut (in both directions, score = 6; in a
single direction, score = 4), using a longer ‘shortcut’ that
included one additional block length (in both directions,
score = 5; in a single direction, score = 3) or two
additional block lengths (in both directions, score = 2; in
a single direction, score =1). Random walking and
Fig. 3 The relationship between overall route learning errors and RCPM score, by group. TD typically developing, DS Down syndrome, WS Williams
syndrome, RCPM Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices
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walking along taught routes only received a score of 0.
The sum of these scores over five trials provided a config-
ural knowledge score out of 30 for each maze (if shortcut
criterion was met before five trials, credit [a score of 6]
was given for remaining trials), with a higher score reflect-
ing stronger configural knowledge (maximum score, 30).
Ten percent of the data was coded by a second coder and
achieved high inter-rater reliability (Spearman’s r > .90 for
both mazes). Configural knowledge scores are displayed in
Table 4. The two TD, one DS and two WS participants
who had route knowledge but did not complete the
shortcut trials were not included in this analysis. Data was
not normally distributed.
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs were carried out with a
between-participant factor of group for each maze separ-
ately. This showed a significant effect of group for both
mazes: sparse maze, χ2(2, N = 106) = 6.76, p = .03; rich
maze, χ2(2, N = 101) = 12.47, p = .002. For both mazes,
this was accounted for by poor performance in the DS
group. That is, in the sparse maze, the DS group were
poorer than the TD group only (TD vs. DS, Z = −2.53,
NA = 79, NB = 16, p = .01; TD vs. WS, Z = −1.01, NA = 79,
NB = 11, p = .32; DS vs. WS, Z = −0.74, NA = 16, NB = 11,
p = .48), whilst in the rich maze, the DS group were
poorer than the TD group (Z = −3.52, NA = 77, NB = 14,
p < .001) and the WS group (Z = −2.06, NA = 14, NB =
10, p = .04) (TD vs. WS, Z = −0.52, NA = 77, NB = 10,
p = .60).
Comparison across Rich and Sparse mazes is of limited
value for the disorder groups given the low group num-
bers who qualified for the shortcut trials for both mazes.
Nonetheless, analyses for each of the three groups using
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests showed no advantage in
configural knowledge score for one maze over the
other: TD, Z = −1.15, N = 69, p = .25; DS, Z = −.75, N = 13,
p = .46; WS, Z = −.95, N = 8, p = .40.
Spearman correlations for each group between config-
ural knowledge score and the predictor variables demon-
strated a correlation between the rich maze configural
knowledge score and switching-blocks Go/No Go Error
for the WS group r = −.80, p = .005, N = 10, and between
sparse configural knowledge score and RCPM (r = .232,
p = .032, N = 79) for the TD group; with no significant
correlations for the DS group.
Walked distance
To determine learning across trials, the distance walked
in the shortcut trials was calculated for the rich and the
sparse maze (with the exception of the two TD, one DS
and two WS participants who did not provide data,
mentioned above) (see Table 5). Learning was assessed
by comparing the walked distances on the first and last
shortcut trials. Due to some positive skewness in the
data, non-parametric analyses were conducted.
In both mazes, the TD group had shorter walked
distances in the last compared to the first trial, sparse
maze, Z = −5.63, N = 77, p < .001; rich maze, Z = −3.35,
N = 77, p = .001, whilst the disordered groups showed
no difference between the first and last trials; sparse
maze, DS, Z = −0.98, N = 16, p = .33; sparse maze, WS,
Fig. 4 Success rate of gaining route knowledge and configural knowledge on at least one of the two mazes
Table 4 Configural knowledge scores for each group on each
maze
Sparse maze Rich maze
N Median IQR N Median IQR
TD 79 17 14 77 22 21.50
DS 16 9 6.56 14 5.50 9.50
WS 11 16 21 10 20 22.88
IQR interquartile range
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Z = −0.65, N = 10, p = .52; rich maze, DS, Z = −0.59,
N = 13, p = .55; rich maze, WS, Z = −0.84, N = 8, p = .40.
To determine whether learning in the TD group
differed significantly from the atypical groups, signed
difference scores were created by subtracting the walked
distance on the last trial from that of the first trial.
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA revealed a significant group dif-
ference in learning for the sparse maze only (sparse, χ2
(2, N = 103) = 13.58, p = .001; rich, χ2 (2, N = 98) = 4.90,
p = .086). This group difference was due to stronger
learning in the TD group than the DS group: TD vs.
DS, Z = −3.38, NA = 77, NB = 16, p = .001 and margin-
ally stronger learning than the WS group: TD vs.
WS, Z = −1.85, NA = 77, NB = 10, p = .064 (DS vs. WS,
Z = −1.27, NA = 16, NB = 10, p = .21).
The same set of analyses was run again, excluding
participants who succeeded in meeting the criteria for
having found the shortcut for that maze. This was to
characterise any learning that took place even if the
shortcut was not found. For the TD group, the difference
between first and last walked distances only remained
for the sparse maze (sparse maze, Z = −2.77, N = 41,
p = .006; rich maze, Z = −0.77, N = 35, p = .44). For the
DS and WS groups, there was no evidence of learning
across trials, DS sparse maze, Z = −1.60, N = 14, p = .11;
DS rich maze, Z = −1.02, N = 12, p = .31; WS sparse maze,
Z = −1.83, N = 5, p = .068; WS rich maze, Z = −1.83, N = 4,
p = .068. Group differences in the effect of learning
remained significant for the sparse maze, on account
of stronger learning in the TD than DS group only,
χ
2 (2, N = 60) = 8.36, p = .02 (TD vs. DS, p = .006; TD
vs. WS, p = .17; DS vs. WS, p = .52) and was non-
significant for the rich maze, χ2 (2, N = 51) = 3.04, p = .22.
Alternative strategies
Some participants were observed using an alternative
strategy which involved summing the two taught routes
in order to get from the green to the blue shed (or vice
versa). Arguably, this does not require configural know-
ledge at all, but relies on route knowledge instead. A
taught route strategy was classified as walking the
summed length of the two taught routes either in one
direction or both directions on a shortcut trial. A second
coder coded 10 % of the data with 100 % agreement
across raters. Only a handful of participants used this
strategy more than once. Thus, we analysed whether
participants used a taught route strategy during any of
their shortcut trials (a maximum of ten trials [five sparse
maze, five rich maze trials]), but recognise that this does
not necessarily reflect consistent use of this strategy.
Chi-squared analysis demonstrated a significant associ-
ation between using a taught route strategy and group,
χ
2 (3) = 9.34, p = .01. The DS group used a taught route
strategy on at least one occasion significantly more
frequently (7 out of 18 DS participants; adjusted standar-
dised residuals ±2.6)) than the TD group (29 out of 88
participants; adjusted standardised residuals ±0.7), whilst
the WS group used this strategy significantly less than
the TD group (1 out of 12 WS participants; adjusted
standardised residuals ±2.0).
Discussion
In a field in which virtual environments are being in-
creasingly used to investigate navigation skills, our find-
ing that the use of sparse vs. rich environments has little
impact on performance is of crucial importance to the
design of future studies. Whilst our rich environment
appeared more ecologically valid, this did not present an
advantage (or disadvantage) for typically developing
children or individuals with DS or WS. This finding
validates the results of studies that have been conducted
with relatively sparse environments as an accurate re-
flection of navigation performance and compliments
knowledge that performance in VEs reflects performance
in the real world [40].
This was also the first study to fully explore large-scale
configural knowledge as a cross-syndrome comparison
of DS and WS. It is evident that configural knowledge is
problematic for these groups. For those participants with
DS and WS who demonstrated route knowledge of the
environment, a large proportion were unable to develop
their spatial understanding beyond route knowledge to
gain knowledge of the configural structure of the envir-
onment. Furthermore, in their endeavour to find the
shortcut, neither group demonstrated any improvement
from their first attempt to their final attempt. This sug-
gests that the lack of large-scale configural knowledge
Table 5 Walked distance for each group on first and final shortcut trials for each maze
Sparse maze Rich maze
N First trial Final trial N First trial Final trial
Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR
TD 77 650.59 315.05 375.65 248.24 77 539.09 344.51 342.62 352.71
DS 16 511.74 283.98 611.90 368.33 13 504.47 316.56 460.40 367.05
WS 10 530.08 133.82 431.26 252.18 8 529.08 314.45 430.08 451.24
IQR interquartile range
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would not have been ameliorated had we provided
additional practice or experience in the VE.
This study also presented previously undemonstrated
complexities in the ability to develop route knowledge.
In the current study, where the environments were grid
structures and participants were instructed to learn
routes to a goal and back, individuals with DS and WS
showed substantial impairments. That is, just under half
of participants failed to gain route knowledge within ten
learning trials. Given that route knowledge can be
gained by these groups (e.g. [17, 18, 36]), it is possible
that the difficulties demonstrated in the current study
could be ameliorated through extensive repetition (be-
yond ten trials). Configural knowledge and route know-
ledge and the comparison between sparse and rich
environments are discussed in detail below.
Route knowledge was associated with performance on
the attention measures in the TD group (predominantly
sustained attention and selective attention). This finding,
discussed in detail below, highlights the importance of
attentional mechanisms as processes which contribute to
the development of navigation skills. Configural knowledge
was related to RCPM score only, highlighting the strong
non-verbal/visuo-spatial component of this sophisticated
navigational ability. For the DS and WS groups, only the
combined measure of attention switching and executive
control was related to performance (it was related to route
knowledge for the DS group and configural knowledge for
the WS group). This suggests that the known weaknesses
in attention [3] in these groups do not cause substantial
limitations to navigation for these group, or that other fac-
tors are substantially more limiting, such as to overshadow
any negative impact of impaired attentional mechanisms
on performance. The relationship between non-verbal
ability and route knowledge in the WS group supports this
notion.
Route knowledge
The routes in the current VEs differed from those that
have been used to-date with these groups. The current
design involved learning a route through a grid maze of
cross-junctions which are arguable, the hardest kind of
junction to feature on a route because each decision
point featured a choice between three potential paths. In
addition, participants’ route knowledge in this study was
a measure of their ability to learn the route from a starting
position to a goal and back again to the start, hereafter
referred to as a return route. These features represented a
substantial challenge; just under half of participants with
DS and WS failed to gain route knowledge of both routes
within a particular maze in the current study. This com-
pared to success from almost all DS and WS participants
and young TD children on a single direction (i.e. from a
start position to a goal only) T- and L-junction designs
[17, 18, 36].
We employed a more expansive battery of attention
measures than used in previous studies. As expected,
this demonstrated differential associations with route
knowledge errors across groups. The DS group showed
a relationship between route knowledge errors and RT
on the switching blocks of the Go/No Go task, a
combined measure of attention switching and executive
control, whilst for the WS group, route knowledge errors
were only related to RCPM score, a measure of non-
verbal cognition. For the TD group, whilst almost all
attention, age and IQ measures correlated with route
knowledge errors, of the attention measures, sustained
attention RT was the best predictor, with some input
from selective attention RT. Chronological age was not
related to route knowledge in the DS or WS group. This
is not surprising as it is widely recognised that level of
cognitive impairment is rarely related to age in these
groups [23].
The current study shows consistency with Purser et al.
[36] for the TD group, where route knowledge was
related to Go/No Go RT. Although the Go/No Go task
is predominantly a measure of executive control,
reaction time is an index of the general attentional re-
sources required to attend to the task and might reflect
sustained attention [39]. Thus, despite the more challen-
ging task demands of the current study, there is overlap
in the mechanisms employed to complete the task by
the typical population. The association with sustained
and selective attention in the current study is logical.
That is, route learning involves selecting the appropriate
subset of landmarks to encode. For route knowledge,
this enables useful landmarks to be paired with junctions,
with reduced attention to less useful landmarks, thus facili-
tating decisions at junctions. Sustaining attention along the
full length of the route enables a person to build knowledge
of the entire route. Sustained attention was the stronger
predictor in the rich environment and selective attention in
the sparse environment. As discussed later, this likely
reflects a stronger need to maintain attention on the task at
hand in the rich maze due to the amount of potentially
distracting information available.
For the atypical groups, the current results demon-
strate that impaired route knowledge in DS or WS is not
an artefact of having learning difficulties; the differential
association between route knowledge and attention
switching and executive control for the DS group but
non-verbal ability for the WS group reflect syndrome-
specific deficits. This pattern, however, shows some
discrepancy from Purser et al. [36] in which route know-
ledge errors were associated with Go/No Go errors
(inhibition), as well as RCPM performance (non-verbal
cognition), for both groups. This difference might reflect
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the differing task demands of the two studies coupled
with the syndrome-specific profiles of strengths and
weaknesses. The association between route knowledge
and attention switching and executive control in the DS
group could be specific to the kind of route knowledge
measured here, i.e. learning return routes. We suggest
that the act of changing direction in a return route re-
quires attentional switching given that the order of turns
and landmarks is reversed in one direction compared to
the other. As attention switching is poor in DS [3, 7],
this could have acted as a limiting factor in acquiring
knowledge of return routes. Training this skill, therefore,
might have ameliorating effects on the ability to learn
such complex routes. However, this does not marry well
with impaired attention switching in WS [3], yet the lack
of association between attention switching and route
knowledge for this group. We tentatively argue that the
differences between the two atypical groups, therefore, re-
flect the syndromic characteristic of poor non-verbal cog-
nition in WS. RCPM performance was associated with
route knowledge in the WS group and thus appears to
represent a limiting factor when acquiring route know-
ledge. The demands on perspective taking and mental
rotation, i.e., non-verbal cognition, are stronger for return
routes as used here, than single direction routes, as used
in previous studies. Within the profile of non-verbal
cognition in WS, mental rotation and perspective taking
performance represent weak areas of ability (e.g. [1]); the
additional demands on these mechanisms might explain
why return route knowledge was solely related to RCPM
in the current study, over and above any input from
impaired attention mechanisms.
Developmental trajectory analysis of route knowledge
was carried out using RCPM score as a measure of non-
verbal mental age. The developmental trajectories
showed an atypical developmental trajectory for the WS
group; significantly more errors than the TD group were
made at low levels of non-verbal ability, but the steeper
rate of development in the WS group enabled them to
catch-up with TD route knowledge performance at
higher levels of non-verbal ability. This suggests that the
strong association with non-verbal ability is particularly
limiting to route knowledge at low levels of non-verbal
ability. That is, at higher levels of non-verbal ability, this
group perform at the level expected for their non-verbal
mental age. This has implications for intervention in
WS. That is, training in non-verbal skills could positively
impact navigation performance. However, given that the
RCPM reflects a multitude of non-verbal skills, further
research would be required to determine the precise
nature of non-verbal training that would have the best
chance of being effective. Based on previous evidence,
likely candidates would be mental rotation and perspec-
tive taking [1] (although, note that impaired non-verbal
cognition is a central characteristic of WS and thus the
potential for improvement is limited).
Developmental trajectories for the DS group demon-
strated that they consistently made significantly more
errors than the TD group regardless of their level of
non-verbal ability. This indicates that their route know-
ledge deficit remains constant across development and is
likely impervious to intervention which concentrates on
non-verbal abilities. The pattern here contrasts to the
‘catching-up’ trajectory observed in DS for single-
direction route with L- and T-junctions [36], thus
suggesting that route knowledge, at least in its simplest
form, can show some improvement with increased non-
verbal ability in DS.
Configural knowledge
Both individuals with DS and individuals with WS dem-
onstrated a deficit in configural knowledge. However,
this cannot be accounted for simply by having learning
difficulties. This is because each group showed different
levels and patterns of performance. First, the impairment
was more evident in DS than in WS; only 10 % of DS
participants found the shortcut, compared to 35 % of
the WS group; and differences in configural knowledge
scores across groups were due to poor performance in
the DS group. WS configural knowledge score did not
reflect as much shortcut success as the TD group, but it
was not statistically different from that of the TD group
(although note that a lower percentage of individuals
with WS [65 %] were offered the shortcut trials than the
TD group [94 %]). Second, the DS group was more likely
than the WS or TD groups to employ a compensatory
strategy in which they simply walked the two taught
routes end to end to get from the start to the finish. This
does not require any configural information at all and
highlights their reliance on route knowledge to find their
way. Thus, although the DS group found it difficult to
learn a return route, once a route had been learnt, they
were able to rely on it.
A deficit in configural knowledge in DS is consistent
with previous research which has demonstrated poor
configural knowledge in DS [9, 34]. Specifically,
Courbois et al. [9] also reported low rates of shortcut
success (two of their ten participants found the short-
cut), and a similar use of tagging together the two short
routes as an alternative strategy to achieve the goal of
getting from the start to the end. Configural knowledge
during navigation has only hitherto been assessed in two
studies with individuals with WS. Broadbent et al. and
Farran et al. [16] demonstrated a deficit in configural
knowledge in WS, in virtual and real-world environ-
ments, respectively. The current results are consistent
with this; the majority of individuals with WS were un-
able to develop configural knowledge in an environment
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with which they had become familiar. This further
demonstrates, in line with Broadbent et al., that the
impairments observed in Farran et al. [16] reflect real
deficit rather than a lack of familiarity with the environ-
ment. The current results also tally with reports of
impaired configural knowledge in large-scale visual
search and re-orientation tasks and in small-scale tasks
[21, 26, 27, 33, 43]. The TD data mirrors Bullen et al.
(2010) and Broadbent et al. [4] who demonstrated an in-
crease in configural knowledge score with increasing age for
a similar age range to that used here.
Participants in the current study were asked to deter-
mine return route shortcuts. Given that return routes in
route knowledge increased the failure rate, relative to pre-
vious studies, we cannot rule out that this also impacted
configural knowledge. If we had asked for a single direc-
tion route, success rates might have been higher. However,
this is unlikely; first, there was no evidence of learning in
the DS and WS groups; second, configural knowledge
scores did not reflect shortcut success in one direction.
We were also able to access the learning process. TD
participants demonstrated shorter walked routes on their
last attempt to find the shortcut compared to their first.
For the rich maze, this was accounted for by those TD
children who found the shortcut, but for the sparse
maze, learning was evident even in those who did not
find the shortcut. This suggests that some TD partici-
pants were able to gain additional knowledge of the
spatial relations between parts of the environment whilst
attempting to find the shortcut, even if they did not
meet the criterion for finding the shortcut. It is possible
that reductions in walked distance resulted from learn-
ing using alternative strategies such as a route-based
strategy, but this would rely on the ability to initially
determine the route, which itself relies on configural
understanding. Taken together, the reduction in walked
routes from the first to the last attempt points to the
benefits of repeated exposure to an environment in
developing configural knowledge for TD children, with
the caveat that this appears to be characteristic of sparse,
less busy and distracting environments only. In contrast,
the DS and WS groups showed no evidence of learning;
as discussed above, this suggests that repetition has
limited potential to facilitate the configural knowledge of
these groups.
It was not possible to determine the mechanisms used
to drive configural knowledge in the DS group. This is
likely because too few DS participants demonstrated
configural knowledge for associations to be detected. For
the WS group, the combined switching/executive control
measure was associated with configural knowledge on the
rich maze. As noted above, this measure was related to
route knowledge for the DS group. Perhaps, as before, this
reflects switching between perspectives. For configural
knowledge, this holds a different emphasis as the partici-
pant is not switching perspectives to simply reverse a
route, but to determine the relationships across spatial
locations in the VE. The switching component might also
reflect the ability to switch between spatial frames of
reference, for example an egocentric representation or
first person perspective of the current view, vs. allocentric
knowledge of the configural structure of the environment.
This is supported by Broadbent et al. [1] who demon-
strated impaired perspective taking in WS and thus tenta-
tively raises the possibility that training perspective taking
skills could foster the development of configural know-
ledge in WS. For the TD group, non-verbal ability was re-
lated to configural knowledge score on the sparse maze.
This might reflect a reliance on complex spatial compe-
tencies such as employing a mental representation of the
environment, a cognitive map. This results contrasts to
the reliance on attentional measures for the TD group
when gaining route knowledge, thus demonstrating the
step change in the non-verbal cognitive processing re-
quired to develop configural knowledge, relative to route
knowledge. The associations discussed were not consistent
across mazes, which suggest that the mazes had slightly
differing task demands, discussed below.
Sparse vs. rich environments
The majority of studies that have used VEs have
employed relatively sparse environments. In this study,
we contrasted sparse and rich environments for the first
time. Interestingly, and of importance to the design of
future studies, this had little impact on performance.
The ability to learn the two taught routes was compar-
able across the two maze types for all groups. The
patterns of correlations with route knowledge were
broadly similar, with the exception of subtle differences
in associations for the TD group. That is, there were
stronger associations with selective attention for the
sparse maze and with sustained attention for the rich
maze. The variance explained by these attention mea-
sures left a lot of variance unexplained and so they are
by no means the sole or dominant contributor to route
knowledge. Despite this, the associations are reasonable
given the visual differences between the two maze types.
In the sparse maze, the landmarks stood out from the
background of brick walls, and thus the association with
selective attention likely reflects TD participants’ efforts
to attend to the most useful subset of landmarks as an
aid to learning the route. In contrast, in the rich maze,
the background consisted of buildings. This richness had
the potential to distract TD participants from the task at
hand of learning the route. Thus, those participants who
had strong sustained attention (i.e. were able to stay on
task) had stronger route knowledge. Configural know-
ledge scores and walked distances were also broadly
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similar across maze types. Evidence of learning in the
TD group was stronger for the sparse maze than the rich
maze (i.e. learning was evident even in those who did
not meet criterion for finding the shortcut), and correla-
tions with non-verbal ability was evident for the sparse
but not the rich maze. This suggests that the more var-
ied information in the rich maze facilitated more mixed
strategies for route learning, supported by different
mechanisms that were not revealed by whole sample
analyses. Overall, with reference to absolute perform-
ance, it appears that richer information is no more dis-
tracting or engaging, than the sparse visual array
presented in sparse VEs, and that studies which have
used sparse environments are tapping into broadly the
same processes as used in the arguably more ecologically
valid rich environments. One caveat to this conclusion is
that, although the use of buildings as opposed to brick
walls made the rich VE richer than the sparse VE, both
environments had the same number of landmarks. It is
possible that an environment which is made richer by
including a higher number of landmarks might have
impacted performance to a greater extent than did the
rich VE employed here.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we have demonstrated impaired config-
ural knowledge in two groups with neurodevelopmental
disorders. The deficit was stronger in DS than in WS to
the extent that the DS group often employed an alterna-
tive strategy of tagging one taught route onto another to
reach a goal. This configural knowledge impairment has
implications for independence for these groups, as route
learning strategies that rely on route knowledge alone
are inflexible to change (e.g. change to a learnt route
due to a route being blocked by roadworks, or a
detoured bus route), and it is difficult to get back on
track when lost, without access to some configural un-
derstanding of the environment. We have also further
characterised the development of configural knowledge
in TD children and for the first time underlined the
predominant mechanisms which drive the development
of configural knowledge (non-verbal ability).
Furthermore, we have explored route knowledge for
relatively complex routes which involved remembering a
fixed route in both directions (a return route). This
additional demand, relative to single-direction routes,
coupled with the use of a grid-maze proved difficult for
the DS and WS groups, who often did not gain route
knowledge. This has implications for previously drawn
conclusions that route learning is slow, but unimpaired
in these groups. The additional demands drew on
mechanisms that were themselves impaired in these
groups (attention switching/executive control in DS and
non-verbal cognition in WS), thus limiting their ability
to learn the routes. These relationships provide some
suggestions for training. That is, training individuals
with WS or DS in skills such as attention switching
(DS), non-verbal ability (WS) and executive control
(WS) could positively impact their route learning abil-
ities. Furthermore, verbal prompts regarding the rela-
tionships between landmarks and the spatial location of
landmarks (e.g. [16]) could act to support attentional
processes in these groups, with a downstream effect on
route learning. Given that in the real world, it is usually
important that an individual can not only find their way
somewhere but also find their way back, the limitations
of individuals with DS and individuals with WS in the
current study have serious negative implications for
these groups’ ability to navigate in the real world.
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